Review by Choice Review
Dennett's new book is in the distinguished tradition of his previous volumes. He deftly poses philosophical questions that reflect on the nature of minds of other creatures in contrast to our own. Into this process he brings an evolutionary perspective that is in the best of Darwinian and ethological traditions, without doing injustice to psychology. A few of his particular and timely concerns are questions regarding morality related to thinking in complex animals and robots, and the distinguishing attributes of humans. From his previous successful book on natural selection he imports the models of "Darwinian," "Skinnerian," "Popperian," and "Gregorian" creatures through which he makes powerful arguments for the evolutionary stage that led to an adaptive emergence (contra S.J. Gould's views) of human language, conversing with the self, and culture while retaining our evolutionary heritage. Dennett's ability to entertain while making the reader think about uncomfortable questions makes him one of the great educators. Highly recommended. General, undergraduates through faculty. F. S. Szalay CUNY Hunter College
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Booklist Review
Dennett's clear essay belies philosophy's reputation for abstruseness, something better confined to insular university departments than let loose in public libraries. A popular but serious writer (Consciousness Explained, 1991, and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, BKL My 1 95), Dennett should easily convey his logic about consciousness to the curious with this companionable inquiry. His key concept to discerning consciousness is "intentionality," defined as the something that something is "about," whether it's a molecule that replicates itself, or a John Doe whose purpose is to elude the police. Somewhere across that spectrum of "aboutness," mind comes into existence--is it with bugs? frogs? dogs? robots?--and with such creatures Dennett illustrates what he theorizes makes a mind. That brings up sentience. Many creatures seem to think, like the dog that identifies its human owner from the universe of humans, but Dennett doubts that it--or any creature without language--can reflect on such an act of identifying. Reading like a one-on-one conversation, this intimately written piece should tap the widespread wonder about consciousness. --Gilbert Taylor
From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Dennett (Darwin's Dangerous Idea), director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, avers that language is the "slingshot" that has "launched [humans] far beyond all other earthly species in the power to look ahead and reflect." In this brief study, some of which is drawn from notes for the author's various lectures, and which returns him to some of the themes of his controversial bestseller, Consciousness Explained (1991), he explores how the human mind came into existence. Along the way, he investigates such questions as, How does the mind work? Can we know another's mind? Can a woman know what it's like to be a man (and vice versa)? What are nonhuman minds like? Could a robot ever be "conscious"? Philosopher that he is, Dennett continually raises and refines his questions about these and other subjects, attempting to tease us closer to understanding. By the end of the book, he confesses, he has not so much presented answers as found better questions to ask. Though some readers may be put off by Dennett's cocksure tone, others will be rewarded by his witty, intelligible speculation. (July) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Kirkus Book Review
Dennett wears his philosophical hat in this short volume, based on lectures given at University College, Dublin and Canterbury University (New Zealand). As a result, there is more intellectual gameplay here than late news from the neuroscience front, making for a volume that is sometimes stimulating, but often frustrating. Dennett (Center for Cognitive Studies/Tufts Univ.) is a clever writer and has written insightfully about mind matters in Consciousness Explained (1991) and evolution in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995). But in assuming the philosopher's stance here he admits to raising more questions than answers. At the same time he introduces into these lectures a welter of specialized languages and theories, including the vocabulary of ontology, epistemology, and a string of associated concepts, such as intentionality; the notion of an agent or doer or a ``mind-haver''; physical and design stances; associationism, behaviorism, and connectionism (as in neural networks), referred to as ABC learning and so on. To what avail? Simply, it seems, to come to some conclusions about where in the Darwinian scheme of things thinking and consciousness (and self-consciousness) come into being. In the end, Dennett strongly supports the notion that only with language comes thought. Further, we only arrive in the abstract multidimensional world of ideas by means of written language and the ability to extend our intelligence through the artful inventions of culture and its representations in books, computers, and records (our external mental ``prosthetic'' devices). So nix on intelligent chimps and dolphins, but maybe a kind word for dogs as having been bred to respond to humans. Not a book that will be embraced by animal champions. And not Dennett at his best.
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