- Subjects
- Published
-
Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard University Press
2000.
- Language
- English
- Main Author
- Other Authors
- Physical Description
- 384 p. ; 24 cm
- Bibliography
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- ISBN
- 9780674002968
- Editors
- Foreword
- A Note On The Texts Introduction: Modern Moral Philosophy, 1600-1800
- 1. A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy
- 2. The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy
- 3. The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy
- 4. The Problems of Modem Moral Philosophy
- 5. The Relation between Religion and Science
- 6. Kant on Science and Religion
- 7. On Studying Historical Texts HUME
- I. Morality Psychologized and the Passions
- 1. Background: Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature
- 2. Classification of the Passions
- 3. Outline of Section 3 of Part III of Book II
- 4. Hume's Account of (Nonmoral) Deliberation: The Official View
- II. Rational Deliberation and the Role of Reason
- 1. Three Questions about Hume's Official View
- 2. Three Further Psychological Principles
- 3. Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions
- 4. The General Appetite to Good
- 5. The General Appetite to Good: Passion or Principle?
- III. Justice as an Artificial Virtue
- 1. The Capital of the Sciences
- 2. The Elements of Hume's Problem
- 3. The Origin of Justice and Property
- 4. The Circumstances of Justice
- 5. The Idea of Convention Examples and Supplementary Remarks
- 6. Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions
- 7. The Two Stages of Development
- IV. The Critique of Rational Intuitionism
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Some of Clarke's Main Claims
- 3. The Content of Right and Wrong
- 4. Rational Intuitionism's Moral Psychology
- 5. Hume's Critique of Rational Intuitionism
- 6. Hume's Second Argument: Morality Not Demonstrable
- V. The Judicious Spectator
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Hume's Account of Sympathy
- 3. The First Objection: The Idea of the Judicious Spectator
- 4. The Second Objection: Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue
- 5. The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments
- 6. Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason
- 7. The Concluding Section of the Treatise Appendix: Hume's Disowning the Treatise LEIBNIZ
- I. His Metaphysical Perfectionism
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Leibniz's Metaphysical Perfectionism
- 3. The Concept of a Perfection
- 4. Leibniz's Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth
- 5. Some Comments on Leibniz's Account of Truth
- II. Spirits As Active Substances: Their Freedom
- 1. The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers
- 2. Spirits as Individual Rational Substances
- 3. True Freedom
- 4. Reason, Judgment, and Will
- 5. A Note on the Practical Point of View KANT
- I. Groundwork: Preface And Part I
- 1. Introductory Comments
- 2. Some Points about the Preface: Paragraphs 11-13
- 3. The Idea of a Pure Will
- 4. The Main Argument of Groundwork I
- 5. The Absolute Value of a Good Will
- 6. The Special Purpose of Reason
- 7. Two Roles of the Good Will
- II. The Categorical Imperative: The First Formulation
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Features of Ideal Moral Agents
- 3. The Four-Step CI-Procedure
- 4. Kant's Second Example: The Deceitful Promise
- 5. Kant's Fourth Example: The Maxim of Indifference
- 6. Two Limits on Information
- 7. The Structure of Motives
- III. The Categorical Imperative: The Second Formulation
- 1. The Relation between the Formulations
- 2. Statements of the Second Formulation
- 3. Duties of Justice and Dutie
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