The curse of bigness Antitrust in the new Gilded Age

In this short but persuasive book, Wu (The Attention Merchants), a Columbia law professor, connects the current political climate to a decline in antitrust enforcement. From the rise of U.S. Steel and Standard Oil through the "trust-busting" days of Teddy Roosevelt, Wu shows how antitrust laws, as championed by Louis Brandeis (who coined the term "the curse of bigness"), once functioned as a check on private power. In the modern era, however, enforcement has steadily declined; the George W. Bush administration did not bring a single antitrust action in eight years. The results, Wu argues, are a widening income gap and corporations subverting electoral politics. In the 20th century, he writes, "nations that failed to control private power and attend to the needs of their citizens faced the rise of strongmen who promised a more immediate deliverance from economic woes." The book's brevity is an asset-Wu skillfully avoids economic and legal rabbit holes, keeping the book laser-focused on his thesis: that antitrust enforcement must be restored "as a check on power as necessary in a functioning democracy before it's too late." Persuasive and brilliantly written, the book is especially timely given the rise of trillion-dollar tech companies. (Nov.) © Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.

Should Amazon and Google be broken up like Standard Oil? Yes, argues legal scholar Wu (Columbia Law School; The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads, 2016, etc.), but breaking up is hard to do.The problem is a decadeslong warping of antitrust law, which the author details in this half history, half polemic book. The title comes from a phrase coined by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who agitated against Gilded Age monopolists like John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan. Together with President Theodore Roosevelt, who put enforcement muscle behind the Sherman Act, they persuasively argued that monopolistic practices are inefficient, stifle innovation as well as competition, and court abusive practices against workers. (Think of ATT, Wu suggests, a longtime state-sanctioned monopoly whose breakup cleared the way for the mainstream internet.) For much of the 20th century, Brandeis' view was accepted regulatory practice, until the arrival in the 1960s of Robert Bork, who, as a federal judge, prescribed an exceedingly narrow interpretation of the Sherman Act: So long as consumer prices didn't rise, no conglomerate qualified as a monopoly, regardless of market share. The Borkian argument, however far afield from Sherman's intent, is now gospel, Wu writes, rendering Security and Exchange Commission antitrust regulators toothless. This has allowed Google to bloat with buyoutsthough, as Wu points out, it was a beneficiary of antitrust enforcement against Microsoftdeveloping unchecked acquisitive instincts that have eliminated competitors, with Facebook and Amazon following its lead. The author convincingly draws parallels between the new "tech trusts" and the Gilded Age titans, but one wishes for more fire in the argument: Wu's background about Brandeis is important, but the modern implications could be better woven into his narrative. As it is, his strongest cases for breaking up Google are tucked into dry concluding policy prescriptions.A valuable briefing on an underappreciated business problem, but it could use a bit of Roosevelt's hard-nosed attitude. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.