Being evil A philosophical perspective

Getting a grip on the nature of evil is difficult. Russell (ethics and moral philosophy, Univ. of Sydney, Australia) begins this concise, interesting book with what people really mean when they talk about "evil." Russell observes that for some, evil is literally incomprehensible; for others, it possesses a particular psychological hallmark, which he goes on to describe. If one focuses on 9/11 and other horrific events, one might conclude that evil is absolutely real. But consider the mythical standing of evil, starting with the Book of Genesis. One can ask whether evil is just another word for extreme wrongdoing or whether it denotes a peculiar metaphysical quality that cannot be reduced to ordinary conceptions of "badness" or "wrongness." The author considers different aspects of thinking about evil, including the banality of evil, the nature of an evil person, and in what sense anyone can be said to be evil. The question underlying this book is whether evil is a useful concept. Russell pays attention to the recent philosophical literature on this theme, and the examples he uses are contemporary--e.g., serial killer Ted Bundy, mass murderer Dylann Roof, and terrorist/mass murderer Anders Breivik. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty. --Richard White, Creighton University

Russell (Evil), professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney, delivers a concise, enthralling exploration of the philosophical nature of evil. In six chapters, Russell covers what evil might be, the qualities necessary to make something an "evil" action, the context of Hannah Arendt's comment about the "banality of evil," whether or not a person can be evil, and the ways the reader (or Russell himself) might be evil. In the first chapter, he runs quickly through a number of potentially evil actions or people--the 9/11 terrorists, serial killers, Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik--and sums up what he believes are the key elements that make for an evil act: the act is morally wrong, the wrongdoer is culpable, the act is intentional, and there are numerous victims. Russell goes on to argue that Arendt's understanding of Adolf Eichmann as being evil only through his own subservience neglects Eichmann's "malicious, clear-sighted" intentions, and, upon considering the proposition that "an action is evil if and only if it is extremely wrong," Russell demonstrates why this statement can't be a complete definition. The strength of Russell's thorough analysis lies in his ability to break down complex philosophical thinking into lay reader--friendly rubrics. These nuanced arguments will push any reader toward a fruitful intellectual engagement with the nature of evil acts. (Nov.)