Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Loyn (In Afghanistan), a former BBC correspondent and Afghan government adviser, ranges from the front lines to the halls of power in this deeply reported chronicle of America's "forever war." He begins the narrative in 1996, when the Taliban entered Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal, and documents the U.S. invasion following 9/11, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "light-footprint plan," which required partnering with local militias, contributed to Osama bin Laden's escape from the Battle of Tora Bora. By refusing to negotiate with the Taliban early on, U.S. officials helped to prolong the war, according to Loyn, who offers blunt and persuasive assessments of the tactics and policies of Gen. David Petraeus, U.S. ambassador to Kabul Karl Eikenberry, and other higher-ups. Loyn also sheds light on the downfall of former Afghan president Hamid Karzai, the failure of extensive agricultural projects to provide farmers in Helmand and Kandahar provinces with a viable alternative to growing opium poppies, and controversies over night raids and harsh treatment of civilian detainees. Though U.S. troops are on their way out of the country, Loyn argues that "representatives of the frail, new democratic Afghanistan... will need support for some time yet." Distinguished by its granular detail and insider access, this is an authoritative study of where things went wrong. (Oct.)
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Review by Library Journal Review
Award-winning foreign correspondent Loyn (Frontline: The True Story of the British Mavericks Who Changed the Face of War Reporting) offers insight on the motivations and tactics of insurgents, government officials, and the military as the United States leaves its longest war. Drawing on interviews with Kabul commanders, Taliban members, and Afghan journalists, as well as his knowledge of Afghanistan as an intermittent resident for nearly three decades, the author endeavors to assist both decision-makers and general readers in the often-forlorn quest of learning from history. Loyn divides his account into five phases, similar to military historian Carter Malkasian's The American War in Afghanistan, which is so far the only comparable study with the same parameters. Phase One (2001--06) featured improvisation and lack of coordination among the military, civilians, and NGOs; Phase Two (2006--09) witnessed the regrouping of the Taliban and a devolution into a shooting war rather than a so-called "peace-keeping" war; Phase Three (2009--11) marked the Obama administration's surge in troop numbers and a return to counterinsurgency; Phase Four (2011--14) saw the continuation of the war after NATO's withdrawal; and Phase Five (2014--21) included the transformation of the role of American troops (from combat, to training and assisting) and the departure of the U.S. military. VERDICT This retrospective (offered rather early for historical perspective, but in time for policy debates) provides valuable insight on the longest conflict in U.S. history.--Frederick J. Augustyn Jr., Lib. of Congress, Washington, DC
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Review by Kirkus Book Review
Former BBC journalist Loyn turns a gimlet eye on the war in Afghanistan, the longest in the history of the U.S. "This is not a failed nation but a nation that has been failed," writes Loyn, who was on hand for many significant moments of the war. Afghanistan has been failed, he enumerates, by a confused military doctrine. American forces invaded on the premise that it was best to fight and get out rather than engage in nation-building; the U.S. saw itself "not as an imperial invader but a force for good, spreading enlightenment and democracy." Some of the other coalition forces were less sure: A German senior officer sharply reminded an American commander that only part of the job was military, the rest political, while "British troops went into Iraq and Afghanistan with a confident swagger, believing that centuries of imperial experience made them uniquely well suited to the complex work required." As it is, writes Loyn, the U.S. forces turned out to be the more effective, though there was plenty of learning to be done. They had little idea of the political and ethnic makeup of the country and not much sense that they had to focus on stabilizing the country for the great mass of the people as well as on destroying the Taliban, who could have been neutralized early on, given better handling. On that score, Loyn charges that the Taliban were willing to surrender, but Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense and manager of the war, rejected the offer. While early U.S. commanders asked Rumsfeld to sideline coalition forces, later ones came to rely on their allies, only to fear "a domino effect, where other nations followed France and pulled out early." Loyn's pages are steeped in tragic misinterpretation and always with a sympathy for ordinary people who deserved much better. A well-executed and dispiriting study of imperial overreach and cultural collision. Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
