The devils will get no rest FDR, Churchill, and the plan that won the war

As lawyer-turned-historian Conroy (Jefferson's White House) notes in this in-depth account of the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, by the time Allied leaders met in Morocco, it was more than two years since France had fallen and the British had barely escaped Dunkirk. Meanwhile, the U.S. had only arrived in the European theater two months earlier, when Gen. George Patton ("a cursing comic book warlord with a high-pitched voice") landed his troops in North Africa. Seeking to hammer out a plan for victory, Churchill and Roosevelt brought their top lieutenants to Casablanca, including White House adviser Harry Hopkins, U.S. Army chief of staff George C. Marshall, and British generals Alan Brooke and Bernard Montgomery. In 10 days of rigorous planning, attendees plotted amphibious landings, discussed the merits of daytime versus nighttime bombing raids, and debated whether to launch or delay an Anglo-American invasion of northwest Europe; the British, mindful of the horrors of WWI, wanted the latter; Marshall and other Americans preferred the former. Conroy vividly describes daily conference sessions at the Anfa Hotel and draws sharp, memorable character sketches of the participants ("no one admired Charles de Gaulle more than Charles de Gaulle"). This gaze into the corridors of power enlightens. (June)

Despite a clash of egos and deep-seated differences, a crucial conclave mapped out a war-winning path. Planning military strategy is an enormously difficult task; when several nations are involved, it becomes even more problematic. Conroy, the author of Lincoln's White House, chronicles the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, when Churchill, Roosevelt, and their senior generals met to plan the next phase of World War II. The conflict was beginning to turn in favor of the Allies but was a long way from over, and there were serious divisions about how to proceed. A faction of the American delegation wanted to focus their attention on fighting the Japanese, while the British saw the Nazis as the principal enemy. There were also questions about when and how to launch an invasion of Europe and the likely postwar landscape. The French leaders, apparently more concerned with scoring political points than winning the war, were a constant irritant. Disagreements became heated and personal, but the delegation eventually hammered out a feasible plan. It involved the capture of Sicily to secure Mediterranean supply routes, an increase in the bombing campaign aimed at Germany, and a deferral of the invasion of Western Europe until more forces were gathered. While the British achieved most of what they wanted, it became clear that the U.S., as the critical source of manpower, materiel, and money, would henceforth be the dominant player of the Allies. The official minutes of the conference were published in 1973, but Conroy is a diligent researcher and finds some new material in participants' diaries and correspondence, providing extra depth and color. Even though this is the first book-length analysis of the conference, the substance of the proceedings is already well known. For this reason, it will appeal mainly to aficionados of WWII history. Conroy adds personality and background to the official account of the crucial Casablanca Conference. Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.