The moral circle Who matters, what matters, and why

The Moral Circle argues that the three main "competing" moral theories--consequentialist theories, rights- and duties-based theories, and virtue theories--all support expanding greatly beyond the currently accepted range the beings to whom moral considerations are owed. Included among those with lives that matter to them, making them fit recipients of moral concern, are insects and other "lower" forms of carbon-based animal and, perhaps, even some forms of carbon-based plant life. We can also expect that, in the near future, the range of moral concern will have to be extended to advanced silicon-based AI systems. The author is nondogmatic and forthright in his reasoning. He doesn't hector and admits to being disconcerted by some of his conclusions. He writes with great clarity and minimal jargon. His political-philosophical and policy discussions, especially those at the end of the book, are sketchy; this is not intended as a criticism but to point to a need for further reflection. Although Sebo (environmental studies, NYU) does call it a great evil, this reader fears that the large-scale moral and societal changes Sebo envisages might well require a recourse to totalitarianism. Summing Up: Recommended. All readership levels. --Brian T. Hutchinson, Metropolitan State University of Denver

Rethinking responsibility and compassion. Philosopher Sebo argues for an expansion of moral thinking to include animals, insects, plants, microbes, and even artificial intelligence. Rejecting human exceptionalism--the idea that human life has more value than nonhuman life--Sebo grapples with the question of which beings matter and what humans might owe the nonhuman ones. Beings, Sebo asserts, are not only humans who exist currently, but those who may exist in the future, including silicon-based beings who share the human community. "What," he asks, "does it mean for a being to matter for their own sake?" Sebo begins with two perplexing cases that raise critical issues: Does an elephant, such as one kept in a zoo, have a right to liberty? Does a bot, such as one that claims to feel emotions, have the rights of a person? His responses tease out complex ethical debates. To illustrate his explanation of moral theories such as harm reduction theory, rights theory, virtue ethics, and care ethics, Sebo presents examples of moral conundrums: a businessman considering how to dispose of toxic waste; the morality of the insect-farming industry; and a young woman who unexpectedly discovers that one of her roommates is a Neanderthal and the other, a bot. In the latter case, how might the woman's relationship with them change because of these revelations? Sebo sees a future in which silicon-based beings evolve "with the capacity for more complex and varied motivations than humans and nonhuman animals." Will that capacity give them value in humans' moral circle? The ethics of the Anthropocene, Sebo asserts, requires that we increase the probability that our actions will help others and decrease the probability that our actions will harm others: We must think cosmically, then globally, and then act locally. A thoughtful unsettling of moral certainty. Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.