The battle of Manila Poisoned victory in the Pacific war

Sarantakes (strategy and policy, U.S. Naval War Coll.; Fan in Chief) argues persuasively that the costs to the U.S. Army to take Manila in World War II and the subsequent occupation and reconstruction not only hindered the war in the Pacific for the Americans but was counterproductive to their interests too. General Tomoyuki Yamashita (1885--1946), the Japanese commander, was reportedly determined to make the battle as costly as possible and embarked on a campaign to make that happen. To rout the well-entrenched Japanese and limit casualties, the American forces pounded much of the city into rubble with artillery. Japanese atrocities muted much of the criticism the U.S. deserved, however, and the effort and supplies needed to rebuild infrastructure and feed the population proved to be a drain on the U.S. war effort in the Pacific. VERDICT Taking a whole-army approach, Sarantakes describes the contributions of all units and levels of command, along with discussions of unit mobility, intelligence, and tactics. This strategy makes for a detailed and comprehensive treatment of a generally under-researched but crucial battle. This deeply researched and well-written work will certainly be enjoyed by readers of World War II history.--Chad E. Statler